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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW
(29 September - 12 October)

EASTERN EUROPE

--Poland-Czechoslovakia: Polish and Czechoslovak police detained several leading dissidents last week as they were congregating for their third secret meeting since mid-August. Other participants managed to escape during what was apparently a violent confrontation. At their previous clandestine meetings, representatives of the two dissident groups released communiques that noted their agreement to cooperate and support dissident activity elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The police were waiting at a site near the Czechoslovak-Polish border and apprehended, among others, Polish dissident leader Adam Michnik and Czechoslovak "Charter 77" spokesman Jaroslav Sabata. The Czechoslovaks charged Sabata, who is under suspended sentence from a previous conviction for dissident actions, with "resisting public authority"; Sabata remains in custody. There is no information on Michnik's fate, but dissidents in Warsaw presumably would publicize the fact if Polish authorities still held him.

The Czechoslovaks in the past have urged the Polish Government to take stronger actions against its dissidents. Czechoslovak party secretary Fojtik visited Poland in late September and may have discussed methods to counter the dissidents' efforts to coordinate their activities. Polish and Czechoslovak police appear to have cooperated closely during last week's incident.

This publication is a compilation of articles prepared by the geographical divisions of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

Inquiries may be directed to the Production Staff, _______ 25X1

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LATIN AMERICA

Paraguay: Combined Western diplomatic pressure on the Paraguayan
Government is beginning to act as a powerful inducement to avoid human
rights abuses. This is the conclusion reached by the US Embassy after
being informed that, in view of expressed US concern, political pris-
oners engaged in a hunger strike to publicize their case had been
transferred to a hospital.

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This is the second example in three months of US, British, West German and French cooperation in human rights issues in Paraguay. Close cooperation in the case of arrested human rights activist Domingo Laino in July apparently convinced the Paraguayan Government that it faced formidable diplomatic pressure, and this led directly

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AFRICA

to Laino's release.

--Zaire: The government has demonstrated some progress on human rights during the last few months, but the overall results are mixed. President Mobotu remains aware of US concern on the issue, and existing abuses can generally be attributed to bureaucratic incompetence rather than intentional malevolence or legal and institutional prejudices. Mobutu probably will continue his efforts at gradual reform, but only so long as the process does not weaken his position.

On the positive side of the ledger:

- --Mobutu declared an amnesty last June for Zairians living abroad, and Zairian officials are cooperating with the UN High Commission for Refugees in caring for and facilitating the return of the exiles.
- --Zairian officials generally have been cooperating with Red Cross officials making inspections of the country's prisons.

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--Mobutu announced recently that military rule in Shaba Region will be terminated at the end of the year and that the estimated 2,000 - 3,000 political detainees held in a detention camp since the outbreak of the hostilities in Shaba last May would be released this month.


On the negative side:

- --Mobutu's amnesty has not been extended to include political or military prisoners.
- --Mobutu's army has not been reorganized and still commits excesses against the civilian population.
- --Corruption in both the military and civilian sectors remains rife.
- -- The gap between the standard of living of Zaire's elite and that of the masses continues to widen.
- --Mobutu remains reluctant to embark on a path of national reconciliation with the disaffected inhabitants of Shaba Region and some discrimination against Shaba residents apparently continues.

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- --Namibia: Nearly all Namibian political groups are likely to boycott the election in Namibia that South Africa is planning to hold in early December. Only the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance--supported by Pretoria--and a small group of hardline whites will participate. Leaders of the major Namibian churches, moreover, have petitioned South African Prime Minister Botha not to hold an election without UN participation, and some church leaders appear ready to support a boycott of the election.
- On 7 8 October, leaders of the Namibian National Front--a coalition of ethnic-based parties that oppose the Turnhalle Alliance--called for a boycott of any election that is held without UN participation. The decision apparently resolved a disagreement that had threatened to split the loose coalition. The exclusively white Federal Party had been especially reluctant to forgo a chance to win at least a few seats in a constituent assembly.

The leaders of the six major churches in Namibia held a conference last week and issued an open letter to Prime Minister Botha reasserting their approval of UN Secretary General Waldheim's recommendations for implementing a transitional program for Namibia. The church leaders



ASIA

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--South Korea: President Pak Chong-hui, even while committed to maintaining strong centralized rule, seeks to fashion a more relaxed political environment in South Korea. Over the past few years, pressures from abroad have been the most direct cause of concessions in the human rights area, but Seoul attaches importance to portraying these actions as responses to internal pressure alone. Foreign initiatives have been especially effective when Pak has been both confident about his domestic position and motivated to improve relations with the US.

In late 1978, Pak will be likely to give serious consideration to a further easing of controls. A respectable government showing in the December assembly election could provide the reassurance Pak seeks on the domestic front. The prospect of a summit with President Carter would almost certainly impel Seoul to minimize points of friction in relations with the US. Real political concessions, however, would have to involve some fundamental change on the implementation of Emergency Measure Nine (EM9), and possibly on the detention of Kim Tae-chung as well.

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--Philippines: President Marcos is clearly concerned that the level of hostilities in the southern Philippines, which has increased over the past several weeks and includes well-publicized accounts of civilian casualties, will serve to reinforce the arguments of his

human rights critics and may possibly complicate the US-Philippine bases negotiations currently in progress.

In an effort to counter this development, Marcos publicly announced on 7 October his intention to hold elections for legislative councils in two regions, including such Muslim strongholds as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Zamboanga. Characteristically, the Philippine leader avoided setting any specific date or mentioning any other steps toward quasi-autonomy which would lend credence to the notion that he was endorsing the concept of a single, unified Muslim territory in the south.

--Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with President Zia-ul-Haq, who is under domestic and international pressure to spare former Prime Minister Bhutto's life, continues to grow in Pakistan, but so far there appears to be no plan to replace him.

Last month, Bhutto's followers stepped up agitation in an effort to save him from execution. Sometime this fall the Supreme Court is likely to rule on Bhutto's appeal of his conviction for a political murder. If the court, as expected, upholds the death sentence, Zia would then make the final decision on Bhutto's fate.

Leaders of Bhutto's party expect a strong public reaction to a decision to execute the former Prime Minister, even though the wide-spread detention of Bhutto supporters has halted their antigovernment campaign. Party leaders apparently have no hope that Bhutto can be saved but believe that popular agitation might be strong enough to bring down Zia.

Zia's political allies are also critical of his performance. Politicians remain in the cabinet but are charging privately that Zia has reneged on the promises he made to induce them to join. Among their grievances are his failure to make a firm commitment to hold an election and to give cabinet ministers real authority. Ultimately, Zia's ability to stay in office depends on the continued support of the military. So far, military officers do not appear to be planning to move against the President. They may well prefer to leave him in office at least until he decides Bhutto's fate. Any decision by Zia is bound to be unpopular with some sector of Pakistani society.

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